COMPLAINT Doc # 2 WITH ATTACHMENTS April 05, 2024 (2024)

Case

SPRING LAKE APARTMENTS LLLP Vs. EARL SPINKS.et al

Mar 12, 2024 |BEDINGHAUS, SUSAN |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION DAMAGES $2,500.01 - $15,000 |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION DAMAGES $2,500.01 - $15,000 |24-002185-CO

Case

BAY POINT PLAZA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION INC Vs. PEGGY EDWARDS. et al

Feb 19, 2024 |BEDINGHAUS, SUSAN |REAL PROP - MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - COUNTY UP TO $15,000 |REAL PROP - MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - COUNTY UP TO $15,000 |24-001504-CO

Case

ROTHY SOUN Vs. STEVEN EDWARD DAVIS

Feb 20, 2024 |JAGGER, EDWIN |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |24-001533-CO

Case

TA CYPRESS POND FEE OWNER Vs. DARREN ARROYO

Feb 22, 2024 |CARASSAS, JOHN |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |24-001611-CO

Case

MERCEDES ROMAO TOIGO Vs. A AND H REAL PROPERTIES LLC

Aug 12, 2024 |ANDREWS, MICHAEL F |REAL PROP/MTGE FRCL OTHER REAL PROP2 $50,001 - $249,999 |REAL PROP/MTGE FRCL OTHER REAL PROP2 $50,001 - $249,999 |24-003584-CI

Case

BOLEY CENTERS INC Vs. FRANK S PADILLA

Mar 04, 2024 |CARASSAS, JOHN |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |24-001947-CO

Case

NEWREZ LLC Vs. BARBARA SCHILLINGER.et al

Jul 10, 2024 |NEWTON, CYNTHIA J |REAL PROP/MTGE FRCL NON-HOMESTEAD RES1 $0 - $50,000 |REAL PROP/MTGE FRCL NON-HOMESTEAD RES1 $0 - $50,000 |24-003073-CI

Case

SRP SUB LLC Vs. MARISSA COFFMAN.et al

Feb 21, 2024 |BEDINGHAUS, SUSAN |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |24-001599-CO

Case

DEW SEVEN LLC Vs. GG III SAL LLC

Feb 02, 2024 |JAGGER, EDWIN |NON RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |NON RESIDENTIAL EVICTION POSSESSION ONLY (NON-MONETARY) |24-001075-CO

Ruling

M.A. Silva Corks, USA, LLC vs Ursus Development Group, Inc., et al.

Sep 06, 2024 |SCV-268124

SCV-268124, M.A. Silva Corks, USA, LLC v. Ursus DevelopmentGroup, Inc., et al. Defendant Des Architects & Engineers, Inc.’s motion to bifurcate is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ counselshall submit a written order consistent with this tentative ruling and in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1312.Analysis: CCP § 597 provides, When the answer pleads that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, or by a prior judgment, or that another action is pending upon the same cause of action, or sets up any other defense not involving the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action but constituting a bar or ground of abatement to the prosecution thereof, the court may, either upon its own motion or upon the motion of any party, proceed to the trial of the special defense or defenses before the trial of any other issue in the case… CCP § 1048(b) provides, “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or whenseparate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause ofaction…” “[T]he objective of the bifurcation of the issues is avoidance of waste of time and moneycaused by the trial of issues which may be rendered moot…” (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52Cal.App.3d 118, 135.) Defendant requests this Court bifurcate its statute of limitations defense and try it first beforePlaintiffs’ case-in-chief. Defendant generally argues that doing so would benefit the Court and the partiesbecause, if Defendant prevails, it would save time by eliminating the need to try Plaintiffs’ claims againstit. However, Defendant’s arguments are not compelling. Rather, as demonstrated in Plaintiffs’ oppositionto this motion, bifurcating the statute of limitations defense would not save the Court or the remainingparties time because it would duplicate witness testimony would not necessarily relieve this defendantfrom this case. This is so because the statute of limitations defense is intertwined with Plaintiffs’allegations regarding the history of attempted repairs of the construct defects. While bifurcation couldexpedite the process for this defendant, it would not do so for everyone involved. It would prolong it.2-3. SCV-270466, Sanchez Haro v. SDI Insulation, Inc. Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to his document production requests is DENIEDwith respect to request no. 21, and otherwise GRANTED. Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to compelfurther responses to his special interrogatories is GRANTED. Within 14 calendar days of the entry of theorder on this motion, Defendant shall serve on Plaintiff code-compliant, verified supplemental responsesto both forms of discovery. Sanctions are awarded to Plaintiff in the total amount of $4,870. The Court will sign the proposed orders submitted by Plaintiff, with an appropriate modification toindicate the partial denial of the motion to compel document production responses.I. Background Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his former employer, violated a number of provisions of the LaborCode in connection with his employment, including minimum wage, overtime, meal period, and restbreak violations, as well as failure to reimburse employees for employment-related expenditures. Plaintiffproposes to pursue this matter as a class action on behalf of himself and all of Defendant’s other hourly ornon-exempt employees during the applicable statute-of-limitations period. Plaintiff has propounded discovery on Defendant, part of which is directed toward acquiringevidence relevant to class certification. This matter comes on calendar for Plaintiff’s two motions tocompel further responses to his request for production of documents (“RFP”) and special interrogatories(“SROGs”).II. Request for production of documents A. Plaintiff’s alleged untruthfulness Defendants’ counsel declares that “the Interrogatories . . . were verified responses which identifiedspecific witnesses/persons, facts/circumstances and information rebutting each of the claims ofPlaintiff…,” and identifies by name four “witnesses who[] know Plaintiff is not telling the truth from theirhaving worked directly with him, as identified in discovery.” (Kelly Dec., ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants amplifyupon that theme in their opposition memorandum, asserting that “facts and specific witnesses wereprovided establishing the lack of truthful claims by Plaintiff, himself” and that “Defendant has establishedthat Plaintiff is not…an injured person as claimed.” (Oppo at pp. 2, 3.) Defendants’ point seems to be that because they have identified witnesses who, they claim, willtestify that they “were right next to [Plaintiff]” while he was taking the meal and rest breaks he claims tohave been denied, there is no need for the class certification process because Defendants have definitivelyruled out Plaintiff’s suitability to act as a class representative. Therefore, Defendants argue, Plaintiffcannot seek information going to class certification. (Oppo at p. 3.) Notably, one of the witnesses Defendant identifies, Sam Jobrani, is the CFO of defendant SDIInsulation and the person most knowledgeable regarding its policies regarding employee reimbursement.(Haber Dec., MTC SROG responses, Exh. 1 at p. 16 [SROG no. 70] and Exh. 2 at p. 17 [response].) Thatraises some questions about his credibility. Even leaving that point aside, however, the fact thatDefendants have some witnesses who Defendants claim will testify to something does not, as Defendantswould have it, “establish[] the lack of truthful claims by Plaintiff.” Weighing contradictory testimony is ajob for a trier of fact at a trial, not for a court ruling on a discovery motion. Even at trial, the testimony ofwitnesses for one side, without cross-examination by the other side, would establish nothing. Theanticipated testimony of Defendant’s designated witnesses is certainly no basis for preventing Plaintifffrom discovering other witnesses who might say something different. It is unclear whether Defendants are arguing that Plaintiff’s alleged untruthfulness renders only theclass certification process unnecessary, or that the entire trial of Plaintiff’s personal claims is unnecessary.However, it does not matter because neither is correct. Defendants cite no authority, and the Court isaware of none, for the proposition that a court must, or even may, take the word of a defendant’sdesignated witnesses in ruling on a plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff, however, provides extensive authority forthe proposition that the adequacy of a class representative is a question for the class certification stage oflitigation, not the discovery stage. (MPA at pp. 5-6, citing Lee v. Southern California University forProfessional Studies (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 782, 784 [plaintiff’s adequacy as class representative “andall other matters pertaining to whether the action is appropriate for class treatment, are issues for the trialcourt to decide when Lee moves to certify the class”].) “[T]o show the merits of one’s case has neverbeen a threshold requirement for discovery in individual or class action cases . . . .” (Williams v. SuperiorCourt (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 558.) “The question of class certification is essentially procedural and doesnot involve the legal or factual merits of the action.” (Knapp v. AT& T Wireless Services (2011) 195Cal.App.4th 932, 938.) Defendants’ arguments about Plaintiff’s alleged untruthfulness are unpersuasive. Defendant shallserve RFP responses that are not restricted to Plaintiff as an individual. B. Privacy Defendants depend on two cases for the proposition that in exercising its discretion regardingprecertification discovery of the identity of class members, “the court must weigh the danger of possibleabuses of the class action procedure against the rights of the parties under the circumstances.” (Oppo atpp. 3-4.) In one of them, Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, potential classrepresentatives had moved in the trial court to compel precertification discovery of the names andaddresses of potential class members. (Id. at p. 290.) The trial court denied the motion. (Ibid.) Thereviewing court found that the trial court “erred in denying [the plaintiffs’] discovery motion withoutexpressly weighing the actual or potential abuse of the class action procedure that might be caused bypermitting the discovery, on the one hand, against the rights of the parties, on the other hand.” (Ibid.)Defendants’ other case, Best Buy Stores v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 772, is inappositebecause it does not concern the disclosure of potential class members’ contact information or any otherinformation about them. Still, it does affirm the trial court’s order permitting precertification discovery,citing to Parris for the proposition that the trial court had engaged in an adequate weighing process. (Id.at p. 779.) The Court agrees with Defendants that a weighing process is required. A case cited by Plaintiff, Alch v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, is closely on pointand strongly suggests that the outcome of the appropriate weighing process favors discovery of theinformation Plaintiff seeks. Alch concerned a class action in which television and movie writers allegedthat a number of studios and production companies discriminated against writers on the basis of age. Theplaintiffs sought highly detailed information from the Writer’s Guild about all its members, including notonly their contact information but their full work history. (Id. at p. 1426, fn. 8.) The plaintiffs sent apreliminary communication to the members, offering them an opportunity to object to the disclosure ofthat information, and “some 7,700 recipients objected to the disclosure of some or all of the requestedinformation.” (Id. at p. 1418.) The trial court concluded that these objections outweighed the plaintiffs’need for the information, but the reviewing court held that this was an abuse of discretion due to theplaintiffs’ compelling need for the information. (Id. at pp. 1428, 1431; see also Williams v. SuperiorCourt (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [contact information for other employees is legitimate starting point forfurther investigation]; Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-1250 [“disclosure ofthe names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery”].) The leading case on California’s constitutional right to privacy, Hill v. National CollegiateAthletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, sets forth a two-stage approach to analyzing invasion of privacy. First,there must be a right to invade: in particular, there must be a legally protected privacy interest, areasonable expectation of privacy, and a serious invasion of that privacy interest. (Id. at pp. 35-37.) Ifthose elements are met, then the second stage “requires that privacy interests be specifically identified andcarefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a ‘balancingtest.’” (Id. at p. 37.) Applying that analysis here, the Court finds, first of all, that none of the informationsought by Plaintiff rises to a serious invasion of the privacy interests of Defendants’ employees andformer employees, in the sense of being “sufficiently serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potentialimpact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.” (Ibid.) Even ifthat were not the case, the Court would find that Plaintiff’s need for the information he is requesting inorder to prepare for class qualification outweighs any privacy concerns. “[I]n applying the Hill balancing test, trial courts necessarily have broad discretion to weigh andbalance the competing interests.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA) v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360,371.) Having exercised that discretion as described above, the Court finds production of the documentsPlaintiff has requested would not rise to an invasion of privacy. Accordingly, all of Defendants’ privacyobjections are overruled. C. Statute of limitations Plaintiff filed the case at bar on March 25, 2022. Defendants argue that the applicable limitationperiod for Plaintiff’s claims is three years and that, therefore, Plaintiffs may seek employment recordsgoing no further back than March 25, 2019. Defendants have provided records going back to January 1,2019, but object to Plaintiff’s demand for “more, more and more information.” (Oppo at pp. 5-6.) It is true that the limitations period on the majority of the Labor Code violations alleged byPlaintiff is three years. (CCP § 338 [three-year period for “action upon a liability created by statute”].)However, Defendant overlooks two crucial points. First, Plaintiff has not only alleged Labor Codeviolations; he has also alleged a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq. (Complaint at p. 18-21 [Eighth Cause of Action].) The limitations period on a UCL actionis four years. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208.) Secondly, all limitation periods longer than 180 days weretolled for the 178-day period from April 6, 2020 to October 1, 2020 by the Judicial Council in response tothe COVID pandemic. (Cal. Rules of Court, App. I, Rule 9(a).) Thus, the limitation period applicable to discovery in this matter is four years plus 178 days. Inhis RFP, Plaintiff defined “CLASS PERIOD” as “the period of time beginning September 28, 2017 andcontinuing to the present.” (Haber Dec., Exh 1, p. 2, ¶ 9.) That is correct: September 28, 2017 is 178days before March 25, 2018, which is four years before the instant case was filed. Therefore, Plaintiff isentitled to discovery reflecting Defendants’ activities during the CLASS PERIOD, as defined. D. Technical deficiencies in Defendant’s responses 1. Introductory statements Defendants begin their responses to Plaintiff’s RFP with two passages headed Statement andObjection to Class Discovery, both of which explain that they apply to all of the responses. TheStatement section states that “[t]he responses set forth herein are made on the basis of a reasonablydiligent search for information and documents reasonably available to Defendant at the present time.”(Haber Dec., Exh. 2, p. 2.) This is improper. “A representation of inability to comply with the particulardemand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonableinquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand.” (CCP § 2031.230, emphasis supplied.)A general comment that every single response is the result of a diligent search does not comply with thestatute’s requirement that such affirmations be made with respect to each particular demand. Similarly, the Objection to Class Discovery section begins “Defendant objects and asserts thatnamed Plaintiff Sanchez-Haro’s role and job duties at Defendant do not make him a person adequatelysituated to represent the alleged class for which suit was filed.” (Haber Dec., Exh. 2, p. 2.) In addition tothis objection not being well taken because, as discussed above, the adequacy of a class representative isnot addressed until a later point in the litigation, it is also improper to make it in this blanket fashion. Anobjection to an RFP must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, orelectronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objectionis being made.” (CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).) Defendant has made no attempt to identify which specificdocuments his “objection to class discovery” is directed to. 2. Non-compliant statements of nonexistence of documents Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s responses regarding documents that do not exist are inadequatebecause they fail to comply with several requirements set forth in CCP § 2031.230. For example,Defendant’s response to RFP no. 31 states, in its entirety, that “Defendant lacks the ability to comply withthe demand for inspection because no documents exist regarding the request.” (Haber Dec., Exh. 2, p.12.) Defendants respond that they are “unclear and unaware of how to produce documents/things whichdo not exist.” (Oppo at p. 6.) CCP § 2031.230 describes the process very clearly. The statute requires the responding party to“affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with thatdemand,” which Defendant has attempted to do, albeit improperly, with the blanket Statement at thebeginning of the responses. It also requires the responding party to “specify whether the inability tocomply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost,misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of theresponding party,” which Defendant has not attempted to do at all. There are additional requirementsrelated to the content of such a statement. The statute is perfectly clear about how to, as Defendantdescribes it, produce documents that do not exist. E. Defendants’ counsel’s opinion of California and federal law In the Conclusion section of its opposition memorandum, Defendants’ counsel provides a critiqueof California and federal employment law, commenting that “the laws being passed in the 21st Centuryhave created a new legal industry to make money driven by attorney’s fees allowance,” and complainingthat “[t]he California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), the Federal Fair Labor StandardsAct (‘FLSA’) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (‘UCL’), are killing small businesses inCalifornia. There is no ‘governor’ for the fuel to the carburetor of this wage/hour engine motoring downsmall businesses in California.” (Oppo at p. 7.) The Court assumes that these comments were not intended to influence its ruling. Nevertheless,the Court feels called upon to remind counsel that it must rule on the basis of what the law is rather thanwhat counsel wishes it were. If counsel believes the law should be changed, he should express hisopinion to the legislative branch of government, not the judicial branch. F. Individual document requests In this section, the Court will address the document requests to which Defendant has objected ongrounds not discussed above. The motion will be denied as to all requests not addressed here. 1. RFP no. 21 Plaintiff requests all documents related to Defendants’ timekeeping practices, including trackingof overtime hours. Defendants respond that they will produce their employee handbook and their benefitsguide. The clear implication is that these are all the documents in Defendants’ possession that respond tothe request. The motion is denied as to RFP no. 21. 2. RFP no. 25 Plaintiff requests all documents reflecting communications between Defendants and theiremployees reflecting either requests to work overtime or requests for clarification of Defendants’overtime policy. Defendants object on the basis that “such ‘communications,’ oral or in writing, wouldrequire Defendant to incur undue time”; that is, on the basis that the request is overly burdensome. ButPlaintiff has not requested anything related to oral communication; this is strictly a request for productionof documents. Defendants’ response does not suggest that it would be unduly burdensome to produce allwritten documents in its possession conforming to the request. The motion is granted as to RFP no. 25. 3. RFP no. 55 Plaintiff requests all documents related to class action waivers, arbitration agreements, or releasesof wage claims associated with any employee. Defendants respond that they will produce “the companyhandbook which describes an arbitration provision but Defendant does not require employees to sign it.”This is nonresponsive. The request is for the documents that any employee did sign, not for theinformation provided to employees about their option to sign. If no employee ever signed an arbitrationagreement, a class action waiver, or a release of wage claim, Defendants may so state in a mannerconsistent with CCP § 2031.230. Otherwise, Defendants shall produce all documents responsive to therequest. The motion is granted as to RFP no. 55. 4. RFP no. 65 Plaintiff requests all documents related to Defendants’ manner of tracking employees’ requests forbusiness expense reimbursement. Defendants respond that the request is unduly burdensome “becausethere is no reasonable way to compile 2017 to present rare reimbursement information on which particularemployee made such request.” That is not what Plaintiff is asking Defendants to do. The request is notfor the reimbursement requests themselves; it is for any documents reflecting how such requests arerecorded or processed, and how Defendants decide how to respond to them. The motion is granted as toRFP no. 65.III. Special interrogatories The Court’s analysis in the previous section regarding Plaintiff’s suitability as a classrepresentative, privacy, and the statute of limitations applies with equal force to the SROGs. Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to its special interrogatories is unopposed, and theCourt will grant it for that reason. Nevertheless, the Court will address the adequacy of Defendants’responses by way of providing Defendants with guidance in preparing supplemental responses. G. SROG no. 1 The interrogatory requests the name, mailing address, phone number, email address, job title, datesof employment, and location worked for every “CLASS MEMBER.” That term is defined to meananyone who worked for Defendant beginning on September 28, 2017. (Haber Dec., Exh. 1, p. 2, ¶¶ 5, 6.) As they did to the majority of the RFPs, Defendants objected to this interrogatory on privacygrounds, asserting that “home contact information is considered private.” Defendants cite to County ofLos Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905 for thatproposition, but the case does not establish what Defendants want it to establish. It does provide adetailed description of California’s constitutional right to privacy, and of the “framework for analyzingconstitutional invasion of privacy claims” announced by Hill, supra. (County of Los Angeles, supra, at p.926.) But that framework includes balancing the privacy interest against other countervailing interests.(Ibid., citing Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-38.) The actual holding of County of Los Angeles is that“although the County’s employees have a cognizable privacy interest in their home addresses andtelephone numbers, the balance of interests strongly favors disclosure of this information to the union thatrepresents them.” (Id. at p. 911.) The specific countervailing interest was a state law regulating therelationship between public employee unions and municipalities, the Myers-Milias-Brown Act, which ofcourse has no bearing on the instant case. In other words, what County of Los Angeles establishes is thatthe constitutional right to privacy is far from absolute. Defendant’s privacy argument is addressed in detail in the previous RFP section of this ruling. Asdiscussed there, the contact and work history information sought by Plaintiff does not rise to a violation ofDefendants’ employees’ and former employees’ privacy rights. Therefore, Defendants must respond toSROG no. 1. H. SROG no. 2 The interrogatory requests the number of employees assigned to each job title. Defendant’sresponse indicates that the number assigned to the job title “Installer” is “X.” This is clearlynonresponsive, and it has the look of a clerical error or inadvertent omission. Whether or not that is true,the response needs to be supplemented. I. SROG no. 3 The interrogatory requests the number of employees assigned to each of Defendant’s locations.The response simply gives the locations, with no number of employees. This is nonresponsive and needsto be supplemented. J. SROG no. 4 The interrogatory requests the number of Defendant’s employees “for each year from 2017 to thepresent.” The response gives approximate figures for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, and the two-year period2022/2023. This is nonresponsive for three reasons: because it gives only approximate figures, because“2022/2023” is not a year, and because it omits the current year. “Where the question is specific andexplicit, an answer which supplies only a portion of the information sought is wholly insufficient.” (Deyov. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) The response also states that “Defendant…only has listing of 2019 employees to present.” Aresponding party who “does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully” to an interrogatorymay so state, but must “make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry toother natural persons or organizations.” (CCP § 2030.220.) “Accordingly, a responding party generallymay not respond to interrogatories just by asserting its ‘inability to respond.’” (Sinaiko HealthcareConsulting v. Pacifica Healthcare (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 406.) If Defendants have in fact made areasonable and good faith effort to obtain the requested information for the years 2017 and 2018, theymay so state in their supplemental response. K. SROG no. 6 The interrogatory requests the number of Defendant’s employees “that terminated theiremployment at any time since September 28, 2017.” Defendants’ response is identical to their response toSROG no. 4, which asked for the total number of employees, not the total number that quit or were fired.All of the problems described concerning SROG no. 4 apply with equal force to SROG no. 6. Moreover,the response cannot possibly be accurate unless every single employee of Defendant since 2017, withoutexception, terminated their employment. The response is nonresponsive in that it appears to respond to a different interrogatory. It needs tobe supplemented. L. SROGs no. 42 and 47 These interrogatories request the total amount Defendant has paid for, respectively, “mealpremium wages” and “rest period premium wages.” Those phrases presumably refer to the requirementthat an “employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate ofcompensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.” (Lab. Code §226.7(c).) “Meal premium wages” and “rest period premium wages” certainly do not mean “wages paid toemployees for the time spent on their rest and meal breaks,” but that is the way Defendants apparentlyinterpreted them, since in response to both interrogatories, they aver that “[s]ince employees are paid fortaking rest and meal breaks, . . . the wage statements, W2’s generated by ADP do not identify or break outseparately the pay for rest or meal breaks.” Plaintiff was not asking how much money Defendants havepaid to their employees for taking legally mandated meal and rest breaks; Plaintiff was asking how muchmoney Defendants have paid to their employees to compensate them for not being provided legallymandated meal and rest breaks. Those are two very different things. Plaintiffs are entitled to the information sought here. That is particularly true in light of Plaintiffs’contention Defendants have produced records showing a failure to incorporate bonuses, such as rest breakand meal premiums, into their overtime calculations. (MPA at p. 7; Reply at pp. 8-9.) Defendants needto supplement their responses to answer the actual questions. If defendants have no way to determine theanswers, they may say so, as long as they do so in compliance with CCP § 2030.220. M. SROG no. 69 The interrogatory requests the total amount Defendants have paid to their employees inreimbursement for business expenses. Defendants’ reply, in its entirety, was “9/2017 reimbursement,” inboldface type. (Haber Dec., Exh. 2, p. 16.) This is clearly nonresponsive and needs to be supplemented.IV. Sanctions CCP § 2030.290(c) (relating to interrogatories) and CCP § 2031.300(c) (relating to documentproduction) both provide that a monetary sanction “shall” be imposed against the unsuccessful party on amotion to compel unless the court finds substantial justification for that party’s position or othercircumstances making sanctions unjust. The Court finds no such justification or circumstances here.“Shall” indicates a mandatory provision; therefore, it is neither here nor there that, as Defendant’s counseldeclares, he has been generous with granting time extensions for moving to compel and had courteous andprofessional interactions with Plaintiff’s counsel. (Kelly Dec., ¶ 7.) Monetary sanctions are to reimbursea party for the “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of” conductconstituting a misuse of the discovery process; they are not punishment for incivility. (CCP §2023.030(a).) N. Time In his declaration accompanying the SROG motion, Plaintiff’s counsel declares that he andanother lawyer have collectively spent three hours preparing the motion, and that they “anticipatespending at least 1.5 hours reviewing Defendant’s opposition papers and drafting Plaintiff’s reply to themotion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories.” Defendant has not filedopposition to the SROG motion, so there is nothing for Plaintiff to review or reply to. The Court findsthat 3 hours is a reasonable time for preparing the SROG motion. In his declaration accompanying the RFP motion, counsel declares that he and the other lawyer“spent at least 5 hours researching and drafting the motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’sSpecial Interrogatories,” and that they “anticipate spending at least 1.5 hours reviewing Defendant’sopposition and drafting Plaintiff’s reply to the motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s SpecialInterrogatories.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Court assumes that the emphasized passages are clericalerrors and that counsel intended to refer to the motion to compel further responses to Plaintiff’s Requestfor Production of Documents. The Court finds the 6.5 hour figure reasonable. Thus, the Court will awardsanctions for 9.5 hours total time. O. Billing rate The standard for calculating attorney fee awards under California law “ordinarily begins with the‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”(PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In calculating the lodestar, “[t]hereasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Ibid.) “The general rule is‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located,’ unless the party claiming feesdemonstrates that hiring local counsel was impracticable or local counsel was not available.” (Marshall v.Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285-286.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares that the billing rate for both attorneys is $700/hour. (Actually, in thedeclaration associated with the RFP motion, counsel declares that it is $750/hour, but since thatdeclaration also claims $4,550 for 6.5 hours’ work and 6.5 times $700 is $4,550, the Court assumes thatthe $750 figure is another clerical error.) That rate is higher than the Court is willing to award. The Courtdoes not dispute that $700/hour is a reasonable rate for attorneys with comparable experience in LosAngeles County, where counsel practices. However, this Court’s “community” is Sonoma County,where billing rates are somewhat lower. The Court’s policy is to calculate attorney fees for attorneys withcomparable experience on the basis of $500/hour. The Court will therefore award attorney fee sanctionsto Plaintiff in the amount of $4,750. In addition, on its own motion the court will award $120 in reimbursement for the filing fees forthe two instant motions. The total amount of sanctions will be $4,870.V. Conclusion The motion to compel responses to the document production requests is granted, with theexception that it is denied as to RFP no. 21. The motion to compel responses to the special interrogatoriesis granted. All of Defendants’ objections are overruled. Within 14 calendar days of the entry of the order on this motion, Defendants shall serve code-complaint, verified supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories and document productionrequests. In preparing the supplemental responses, Defendants shall pay close attention to the legalprinciples discussed in this order. Sanctions are awarded in the amount of $4,870.

Ruling

COLEMAN vs. SANCHEZ, et al.

Sep 05, 2024 |CVCV21-0197682

COLEMAN VS. SANCHEZ, ET AL.Case Number: CVCV21-0197682This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment. A Judgment was filed andexecuted on August 9, 2024. Notice of Entry of Judgment was filed August 20, 2024. Noappearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

OATES PENA vs. OATES LUCAS, et al.

Sep 02, 2024 |CVCV21-0197372

OATES PENA VS. OATES LUCAS, ET AL.Case Number: CVCV21-0197372Tentative Ruling on Motion & Request for Expungement of Lis Pendens and Award of Attorneys’ Feesand Costs: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Rachel Oates Lucas moves for an Order expunging the Lis Pendensfiled by Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sharon Oates Pena on May 21, 2021, for the real property located at 1703Ridge Drive, Redding, CA 96001. Despite being properly served, Sharon Oates Pena did not file an Opposition.Procedural Defect. On August 23, 2024, Defendant/Cross-Complainant filed a “Notice ofSupplemental/Amended Motion & Supplemental/Amended Motion for Order….” The new document was notfiled in compliance with CCP § 1005(b) which requires service on a motion at least 16 court days before thehearing date. Consideration of the late filed document would violate CCP § 1005 and Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’sdue process rights. Accordingly, the Court did not review nor did it consider the late filing in ruling on merits ofthis motion.Merits of Motion. “At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or any nonpartywith an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending toexpunge the notice.” CCP § 405.30. “[T]he court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds thatthe claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real propertyclaim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of expunging the notice if the courtfinds the claimant has not established the probable validity of the real property claim.” CCP § 405.32. “Theclaimant shall have the burden of proof under Sections 405.31 and 405.32.” CCP § 405.30.In this matter, the Complaint filed by Sharon Oates Pena on May 21, 2021, has been dismissed in its entirety. Ajury trial was held on the Cross-Complaint filed by Rachel Oates Lucas and the portion tried to the Court iscurrently under submission. As the party who filed the lis pendens, Sharon Oates Pena bears the burden ofestablishing the validity of her real property claim. There are currently no real property claims filed by SharonOates Pena. Additionally, Sharon Oates Pena did not file an Opposition to the motion and did not provide anyevidence. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for expungement of the lis pendens. No undertaking isrequired. No order expunging a notice of pendency of action shall be effective, nor shall it be recorded in the office of any county recorder, until the time within which a petition for writ of mandate may be filed pursuant to Section 405.39 has expired. No order expunging a notice of pendency of action shall be effective, nor shall it be recorded in the office of any county recorder, after a petition for writ of mandate has been timely filed pursuant to Section 405.39, until the proceeding commenced by the petition is finally adjudicated. This section imposes no duty on the county recorder to determine whether the requirements of this section or of any order expunging a notice of pendency of action have been met.CCP § 405.35 No order or other action of the court under this chapter shall be appealable. Any party aggrieved by an order made on a motion under this chapter may petition the proper reviewing court to review the order by writ of mandate. The petition for writ of mandate shall be filed and served within 20 days of service of written notice of the order by the court or any party. The court which issued the order may, within the initial 20-day period, extend the initial 20-day period for one additional period not to exceed 10 days. A copy of the petition for writ of mandate shall be delivered to the clerk of the court which issued the order with a request that it be placed in the court file.CCP § 405.39.Therefore, while the Court intends to issue the Order forthwith, Rachel Oates Lucas is not permitted to record theOrder until twenty days after service of the written order. The Court notes that the prayer for relief requests theCourt provide notice to the Shasta County Recorder’s Office. That is not ordered. Rachel Oates Lucas can recordthe Order after properly serving the Order and after the waiting time has passed, assuming that no petition forwrit of mandate is filed as noted above.“The court shall direct that the party prevailing on any motion under this chapter be awarded the reasonableattorney’s fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted withsubstantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of attorney’s fees and costs unjust.” CCP§ 405.38. Rachel Oates Lucas is the prevailing party on this motion and has provided evidence of attorney’s feesincurred in bringing the motion in the amount of $2,625. This is evidenced by the Declaration of Mark C. Lucasin which he attaches a billing sheet reflecting 12.5 hours either spent or anticipated to be spent at the rate of $200per hour. The Court finds both the hours spent and the $200 hourly fee to be reasonable. The Court does not findthat Sharon Oates Pena acted with substantial justification or that the circumstances make the imposition ofattorney’s fees unjust. The Court awards attorney’s fees to Rachel Oates Lucas in the amount of $2,625.In summary, the motion is GRANTED. The lis pendens is ordered expunged. No undertaking is required. RachelOates Lucas is the prevailing party on the motion and is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,625. Aproposed Order was provided, however, it will need to be modified to reflect the Court’s ruling.Tentative Ruling on Motion to Deem Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant a Vexatious Litigant Per CCP § 391, et seq.and Probate Code § 1970, et seq.: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Rachel Oates Lucas moves for an orderdeeming Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sharon Oates Pena a vexatious litigant along with several other prayers forrelief. Despite being properly served, Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Sharon Oates Lucas did not file an Opposition.The Court notes that the hearing was originally supposed to occur on August 26, 2024. However, the hearingwas continued to today’s date, September 3, 2024, due to the court calendar. The Court provided notice of thecontinued hearing date to both parties in its Order dated July 31, 2024.A vexatious litigant is a person who does any of the following: (1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing. (2) After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined. (3) In any litigation while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (4) Has previously been declared to be a vexatious litigant by any state or federal court of record in any action or proceeding based upon the same or substantially similar facts, transaction, or occurrence. (5) After being restrained pursuant to a restraining order issued after a hearing pursuant to Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 6300) of Part 4 of Division 10 of the Family Code, and while the restraining order is still in place, they commenced, prosecuted, or maintained one or more litigations against a person protected by the restraining order in this or any other court or jurisdiction that are determined to be meritless and caused the person protected by the order to be harassed or intimidated.CCP § 391(b).A Defendant can move for an order requiring the Plaintiff who is a vexatious litigant to furnish security or for anorder dismissing the litigation. CCP § 391.1. A hearing is required and evidence must be provided for the Courtto impose the requirement that surety be posted. CCP § 391.3(a). Per CCP § 391.7, a party may request thatthe Court issue prefiling order, but again, evidence would need to be presented.Rachel Oates Lucas did not provide any evidence to support the motion. There is no declaration providingevidentiary support for the assertions made in the moving papers. There is no request for judicial notice.As no evidence has been presented upon which the Court can make the requested findings, the motion is DENIEDwithout prejudice. A proposed Order was not provided as required per Local Rule 5.17(D). Rachel Oates Lucasis to prepare the Order.

Ruling

JOHN LABIDI VS DON BRATTON

Sep 09, 2024 |24CHCV00365

Case Number: 24CHCV00365 Hearing Date: September 9, 2024 Dept: F43 John Labidi vs. Don Bratton Trial Date: N/A MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES MOVING PARTY: Defendant Don Bratton RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed RELIEF REQUESTED Defendant is requesting attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 from Plaintiff RULING: Motion for attorney fees is granted. SUMMARY OF ACTION This was an unlawful detainer case filed by Plaintiff John Labidi (Plaintiff) against Defendant Don Bratton (Defendant). On July 8, 2024, this Court granted Defendants motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit that Plaintiff served on Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the LAMC and the LAJCO. Defendant filed this motion for attorney fees on July 11, 2024. Defendant is requesting $1,000 in attorney fees from Plaintiff. Defendant argues in his motion that the rental agreement entitles him to an award of attorney fees. He also argues that the fees sought are reasonable. Defendants evidence in support of his request for attorney fees include declarations from his attorneys, Ben Gharagozli and Kevin Hermansen. The attorney declarations indicate that while the attorneys spent several hours on this case and incurred more than $1,000 in fees, they are only requesting $1,000 in attorney fees. (Gharagozli Decl., ¶ 9; Hermansen Decl., ¶ 11.) They also indicate that they have not provided an hourly log because they have only requested $1,000 in attorney fees. (Id.) ANALYSIS A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys fees when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See CCP § 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a).) A successful party means a prevailing party, and [a party] may be considered prevailing parties for attorneys fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. (Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 178.) Defendant is the prevailing party because the Court granted summary judgment in his favor. The rental agreement that was attached to Plaintiffs complaint provides for attorney fees for the prevailing party in a dispute stemming from the agreement, and those attorney fees are not to exceed $1,000. (Ben Gharagozli, Ex. A, p. 6, ¶ 36.) In determining the reasonableness of fees, courts look to the factors from Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, disapproved on other grounds by Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68 n.5. The factors from Wollersheim are (1) the amount of money involved in the litigation; (2) the nature of the litigation and its difficulty and the intricacies and importance of the litigation; (3) the skill required and employed in handling the litigation, the necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the case, and counsels education and experience in the particular type of work involved; (4) the attention given to the case; (5) the success of the attorneys efforts; and (6) the time consumed by the litigation. (Id.) Defendant has requested the maximum allowable attorney fees under the rental agreement, which is $1,000. This amount is more than reasonable because Defendants attorneys stated that they actually incurred fees in excess of this amount, but they are only requesting this amount because it is the maximum amount that they can request. Defendants motion is granted in the full requested amount. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for attorney fees is granted in the amount of $1,000. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

FCS059299 - SHARMA, R V GOMEZ, LUIS R, ET AL (DMS)

Sep 03, 2024 |FCS059299

FCS059299SHARMA’s Demurrer to GOMEZ’s First Amended Cross-ComplaintTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff and Cross-Defendant RAJ SHARMA (“SHARMA”) demurs to Defendant andCross-Complainant LUIS R. GOMEZ’s (“GOMEZ”) first amended cross-complaint(“GOMEZ 1ACC”) asserting causes of action for indemnity under Labor Code section2802, failure to provide itemized wage statements under Labor Code section 226, andcommon law indemnity. Summarized, SHARMA’s first amended complaint in this casealleges that GOMEZ refuses to remove his construction equipment and debris presenton and damaging SHARMA’s agricultural land; the GOMEZ 1ACC alleges that GOMEZwas SHARMA’s employee by oral agreement and SHARMA committed labor lawviolations.Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency ofthe complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather thanevidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case“with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendantwith the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park TerraceHomeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.)Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The court “assume[s] the truth ofthe allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions,deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)Labor Code Section 2802 Indemnification. The GOMEZ 1ACC’s first cause of actionis for indemnification pursuant to Labor Code section 2802. The elements of such acause of action are (1) the employee made expenditures or suffered losses, (2) theexpenditures or losses were incurred in direct consequence of the employee’sdischarge of his duties or obedience to the directions of his employer, and (3) theexpenditures or losses were necessary. (Lab. Code, § 2802, subd. (a); Cassady v.Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 231.)GOMEZ does not sufficiently allege this cause of action. The GOMEZ 1ACC containsonly a conclusory allegation that he was SHARMA’s employee, without sufficient factualdetail to demonstrate in what way SHARMA functioned as an employer. (Martinez v.Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35 [to employ for wage & hour purposes is to control work,permit to work, or engage for work].) Further, to maintain this cause of action anemployee must show that expenditures were incurred in consequence of work dutiesand/or directions and were necessary. Without information as to what GOMEZ’s workduties and/or directions were these elements are not sufficiently alleged. Nor doesGOMEZ clearly state expenditures or losses. He states only that he “suffered and/orwill suffer damages.” (GOMEZ 1ACC at ¶ 9.)Itemized Wage Statements. Labor Code section 226, subdivision (a) requiresemployers to furnish their employees with itemized wage statements showing details ofwages such as hours worked and pay rates for those hours. (Furry v. East BayPublishing, LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1083.) As stated, GOMEZ’s allegations ofemployment under SHARMA are insufficient.Common Law Indemnification. The GOMEZ 1ACC states neither a loss to beindemnified against nor an agreement under which SHARMA must contractuallyindemnify GOMEZ or a situation wherein the two are joint tortfeasors entitled toequitable indemnity as regards each other. (Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. InterstateFire & Casualty Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041 [requirements for indemnity].)Leave to Amend. Leave to amend is proper where identified defects are amenable tocure. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) It is the pleading party’sburden to show the trial court that a reasonable possibility exists that amendment cancure identified defects in that party’s pleading. (Murphy v. Twitter, Inc. (2018) 60Cal.App.5th 12, 42.) GOMEZ’s filings demonstrate a reasonable possibility thatamendment can cure the identified defects in the GOMEZ 1ACC.Conclusion. SHARMA’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. GOMEZ is to fileany amended pleading within thirty days of the date of this order.Join ZoomGov Meetinghttps://www.zoomgov.com/j/1602210102?pwd=emlhR29SczExam56NFFqWHFvSitmZz09Meeting ID: 160 221 0102Passcode: 650928One tap mobile+16692545252,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)+16692161590,,1602210102#,,,,*650928# US (San Jose)

Ruling

Richard Beale vs Melania Vali

Sep 09, 2024 |24CV-01864

24CV-01864 Richard Beale, et al., v. Melania Vali, et al.Default Prove-UpAppearance required on all matters. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties whowish to appear remotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrangefor a remote appearance. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MERCED Limited Civil Hon. Mason Brawley Courtroom 9 627 W. 21st Street, Merced Monday, September 9, 2024 1:30 p.m. The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows: 1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear. 2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear. Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. Note: Notifying Court Call (the court’s telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court. IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.Case No. Title / Description

Ruling

EAGLE CREEK RANCH VS. HOUSER, ET AL.

Sep 04, 2024 |CVCV21-0197760

EAGLE CREEK RANCH VS. HOUSER, ET AL.Case Number: CVCV21-0197760This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of dismissal. No Request for Dismissal has been filed. Noupdated information has been provided to the Court. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar toprovide the Court with a status of the case and the status of the dismissal.

Ruling

ELIZABETH MOUNESSA, ET AL. VS WILSHIRE HOLT LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Sep 05, 2024 |23STCV26822

Case Number: 23STCV26822 Hearing Date: September 5, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT ELIZABETH MOUNESSA, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. WILSHIRE HOLT LLC, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV26822 [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING PETITIONS TO APPROVE MINORS COMPROMISE Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. September 5, 2024 Claimant Hedassah Saidian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Sam Saidian, has agreed to settle claims against Defendant Wilshire Holt LLC in exchange for $350.00. If approved, the funds will be deposited into a blocked account, subject to withdrawal only upon authorization of the court. Claimant Menasheh Saidian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Sam Saidian, has agreed to settle claims against Defendant Wilshire Holt LLC in exchange for $350.00. If approved, the funds will be deposited into a blocked account, subject to withdrawal only upon authorization of the court. Claimant Binah Saidian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Sam Saidian, has agreed to settle claims against Defendant Wilshire Holt LLC in exchange for $350.00. If approved, the funds will be deposited into a blocked account, subject to withdrawal only upon authorization of the court. Claimant Tehilah Saidian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Sam Saidian, has agreed to settle claims against Defendant Wilshire Holt LLC in exchange for $350.00. If approved, the funds will be deposited into a blocked account, subject to withdrawal only upon authorization of the court. Claimant Yosef Saidian, a minor, by and through guardian ad litem Sam Saidian, has agreed to settle claims against Defendant Wilshire Holt LLC in exchange for $350.00. If approved, the funds will be deposited into a blocked account, subject to withdrawal only upon authorization of the court. Court approval is required for all settlements of a minors claim. (Probate Code §§ 3500, 3600, et seq.; Code Civ. Proc. § 372.) The Court has reviewed the proposed settlement and finds that it is fair and reasonable. Accordingly, the Petitions to Approve Minors Compromise are GRANTED. The Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re: Proof of Deposits Into Blocked Accounts for December 6, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. (California Rules of Court, rule 7.953(a).) If acknowledgements of receipt by the financial institutions are filed before that date, no appearance will be required. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 5th day of September 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

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